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ABSTRACT
This paper explores how unfunded pension obligations
affect the market values of firms. Firms appear to choose the
interest rate they use in discounting future benefit obligations
so as to balance the tax advantages of a low rate against the more
healthy looking annual reports a high rate allows. Investors seem
to penetrate this ruse and value firms as if obligations were figured
at a standard rate. The rate thus used seems to be much lower than
current long term interest rates. Pension liabilities are therefore
overemphasized by the market. There is also some evidence that
pension assets are undervalued. This suggests that growth of the
private pension system might increase savings by investors and
firms.
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The effect of pension obligations on share prices is of intrinsic
interest to anyone concerned with the efficiency of capital markets and the
nature of corporate financial decisions. More generally, however, the ability
of share prices to reflect unfunded pension obligations is an important link in
the effect of private pensions on national saving (Feldstein, 1978). If
unfunded obligations are not fully reflected in share prices, theequity owners
will be induced to increase their consumption incorrectly and nationalsaving
will be lower than it would be with correct perceptions.
This paper uses a new body of data on corporate pensions to evaluate
how unfunded pension liabilities influence the value of corporateequities and
to begin an empirical examination of the corporate decision not to fundpension
obligations fully. The important and novel feature of the new data is infor-
mation on the interest rate assumed by each firm in evaluating thepresent value
of its pension obligations.1 Before such interest rate informationbecame
available, it was difficult to interpret and compare differences among firms in
the extent of unfunded pension obligations. In a previous study, Feldstein and
*
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seligman (1981) warned that the heterogeneity of interest rate assumptions was
the source of a potentially serious problem in measuring the key variable in
their study of the effect of unfunded pension liabilities on share prices.1
The new data make it possible to assess the importance of this source of bias
and to examine whether the market takes the differences in interest rate assump-
tions into account in evaluating pension liabilities.
To understand the link between national saving and the effect of pen-
sion obligations on share prices, it is useful to consider the effect of a firm
that obtains lower present wages in exchange for a promise of future pension
benefits with the same present value but does not fund the resu)ting pension
obligation. As a result, the firm reports higher earnings and adds the earnings
to its capital stock. Over time, the firm's capital stock is increased by an
amount equal to its unfunded pension obligation. If shareholders correctly per-
ceive the unfunded obligation, they will recognize that the change in the form
of employee compensation has not made the shareholders any wealthier and their
consumption will remain unchanged. The net effect of the pension on national
saving will therefore be the difference between the firm's additional retained
earnings and the reduction in the employees' direct personal saving that is
induced by the promise of retirement benefits.2 If, however, the share price
understates the unfunded pension obligation, shareholders will regard themselves
as wealthier, increase their consumption, and thus reduce national saving by a
1The same problem also affects the share prices studies of Gersovitz (1980)
and Oldfield (1977) as well as any other study that uses the reported values
of pension liabilities..
21fl the extreme case in which employees reduce direct personal saving by a
dollar for every dollar of present value of promised pension benefits, the
introduction of the pension would have no effect on total saving.—3—
correspondingamount.
1
The effect of unfunded pension obligations has attracted attention
not only because a significant fraction of the pension obligations ofsome firms
are now unfunded but also because alternative legal funding requirements could
increase the extent to which pension obligations are notexplicitly funded.
Current ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) and tax rulesrequire
companies to fund their pension obligations over a period of years and permit a
deduction in the calculation of taxable income only for the amount contributed-
toa fund. An alternative rule would be a "book reserving" system in which a
firm would not be obliged to fund its pension obligation but could deduct for
tax purposes the present value of a pension obligation that itassumes even if
it does not fund that obligation as long as it reports the obligationon its
"books" (i.e., balance sheet) and finds an appropriate organization likean
insurance company or bank to "guarantee" that pension obligation. The national
savings impact of unfunded pensions of this type would depend on the ability of
share prices to reflect the accumulating liability and therefore toprevent
shareholders from increasing their consumption in response to the apparent but
artificial increase in the net assets of the firm.
In considering a firm's pension obligations, it is important to
distinguish vested benefits from other types of expected pension payments. The
vested benefits are those that will be paid to existing retirees and that would
have to be paid to current employees even if they left the firmimmediately. In
addition to these vested benefits, there are also two other types of benefits
that a firm or its shareholders might take into account. First, "unvested
11n the specialcase referred to in the previous footnote, the provision of a
private pension could actually reduce national saving.-4-
accruedpension benefits" refer to the benefits that current employees have
earned on the basis of their service with the firm but which have n4t yet become
vested. Second, firms also look ahead and, on the basis of expected employee
turnover and projected wages, estimate the pension benefits that current
employees are likely to receive when they retire. Firms may use this very broad
concept of benefits based on past and future employment for the purpose of
determining the tax—deductible contributions that they can make to their pension
fund. Pension assets can therefore exceed both vested pension liabilities and
total past service liabilities.
Focusing on the vested pension benefits is important for two reasons.
First, vested benefits are the only legal obligation of the firm and have been
the principal concern of financial analysts who discuss pension obligations.
Moreover, as Bulow (1979, 1981) has explained, the cost to the firm of any non—
vested pension benefits can in principle be offset by corresponding reductions
in wage payments as those benefits become vested. However, as Feldatein and
Seligman note, it is not clear to what extent such wage adjustments are actually
made in practice or taken into account by financial analysts. It is noteworthy,
though, that while firms are required to report values for vested benefit obli-
gations and sometimes report values for other past service liabilities, the
broader measure of total expected liabilities is not reported.
Most of the estimates presented in this paper refer to the difference
between vested pension liabilities and pension assets. The "unfunded vested
pension liability" (uvPL) reported by the firms in our sample is in fact nega-
tive for more than two—thirds of the firms in our basic sample (92 of 132
firms reported negative UIIPL), implying that their pension fund assets exceed their—5—
vested liabilities. Moreover, the aggregate value of pension assets of the firm
in our sample exceed the aggregate value of vested pension liabilities. Some
analyses using the broader measure of total unfunded accrued pension liabilities
(UAPr) will also be reported. For this variable, 62 percent of the firms in
our basic sample reported a negative value.1
Those firms with negative unfunded liabilities have accumulated more
in pension assets than the present value of the pension benefits that they have
promised to their employees. If these benefit promises establish an upper limitS
on the extent to which the pensions depress private saving,2 the "superfunded"
pensions are potential net contributors to national saving. The extent to which
superfunded pensions do increase national saving depends on the response of
shareholders. To the extent that share prices ignore the value of these excess
reserves, the extra corporate pension fund accumulations will not be offset by
reduced shareholder saving.
Our analysis will generally treat underfunded and superfunded pension
liabilities symmetrically by using a single variable to represent the net liabi-
lity of firms. In section 4 we will however examine this symmetry assumption
explicitly.
The first section of the paper discusses the data that we use and
the basic specification of the corporate valuation equations that are estimated
1When the pension liabilitiesare reevaluated using the market interest rate
in$tead of the lower values assumed by the companies in their calculations,
significantly higher fractions of the companies had assets that exceeded their
liabilities. Using the Baabondrate prevailing at the end of the sample year
suggests that virtually all firms in the sample had pension assets in excess
of both vested and part service liabilities.
need not be true if employees reduce their own saving to offset the
benefits that they anticipate on the basis of their expected future
employment experience and not just the benefits rights that they have
already accumulated.—6—
in this paper. In section 2 we present the basic estimates of the effect on
firms' market values of the net unfunded pension liabilities that the firms
report. The third section then discusses the importance of the alternative
interest rate assumptions used in calculating the present value of liabilities
and presents alternative estimates based on the use of a common interest rate
for all firms.
The analysis in sections 2 and 3 estimate linear relations between the
market value of the firm and the net unfunded pension liabilities. Section 4
considers two generalizations of this basic specification: separate effects of
pension assets and of liabilities, and different effects of positive and nega-
tive unfunded liabilities.
The fifth section provides some evidence on why firms choose different
interest rate assumptions for valuing pension liabilities and, more generally,
why firms have different unfunded pension liabilities.
There is a brief concluding section that summarizes the fundings, com-
ments on the implication for national saving, and indicates some possible direc-
tions for future research.
1. The Specification and Data
The framework for our analysis is a valuation model that relates the
market value of the firm per dollar of its physical capital to several basic
determinants of market value including the firm's unfunded pension liability.
The basic specification is thué the same as that used in Feldatein and Seligman
(1981) and therefore builds on earlier studies of market valuation by Gordon
(1962), Modigliani and Miller (1958), Oldfield (1977), Tobin and Brainard (1977)
and others.-7-
Under certain strict conditions, the market value (v) of a firm's
equity and debt will be equal to the replacement value of its underlying physi-
cal assets (A). More generally, however, the marginal andaverage values of
physical assets will not be the same1 and even the marginal value of an addi-
tional amount of physical capital will differ from one if there are distor—
tionary taxes2 or if the firm's capital stock is not in equilibrium.
Differences among firms in the observed valuation ratio,q =V/A,willreflect
perceived differences in the firms' abilities to provide above—average earnings
and in the riskiness of their earnings and asset value.
The potential earning ability of a firm depends on such things as
market position, patents, know—how, etc. The specification used in the present
study represents future earnings by three variables: (1) the current ratio of
earnings to physical assets, E/A ,whereE includes interest payments as well
as equity profits;3 (2) the growth of earnings over the past decade,4 GROW; and
(3) expenditure on research and developnent as a fraction of the value of the
firm's physical assets (RD/A)
1Hayashi (1981) shows the conditions under which themarginal and average
value of capital which are equal.
2Auerbach (1979), Feldstein andGreen (1980) and King (1977) discuss the
effect of taxes on the market value of marginal additions to the capital
stock.
would in principle be desirable to, adjust E by adding to it the difference
between the firm's pension contribution and the increase in vested benefits
during the year. Such an adjustment would be unlikely to have a substantial
effect since completely omitting E or GROW or both does not change the
implied effect of UVPL/A.
4mis variable is defined in thesame way as it was in Feldstein and Seligman:
the difference between average earnings in the most recent fiveyears and
average earnings in the previous five years divided by the 1979 value of physi-
cal assets in the final years of this ten year period.
4-8-
The capital asset pricing model implies that the risk of investment in
a firm's equity should be measured by the beta coefficient measure of the sen-
sitivity of the firm's share price to the value of the total market portfolio.
The beta value for a firm depends on how broadly the "total market portfolio" is
defined (equities Only; all financial assets; all investment assets including
land, gold, etc.) and on the frequency of the observations used for calculatin€
the beta coefficient (daily, monthly, annual, etc.). The present study employs
the widely available beta values based on monthly observations and an equity
market portfolio that is calculated by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith.
A second measure of risk included in the current study is the ratio of
the net debt1 to total capital, DEBT/A .Ahigher debt ratio increases the risk
of bankruptcy and limits the firm's ability to undertake potentially profitable
investment activities.
Since unfunded vested pension liabilities are a form of corporate
debt,3 they should in principle be included with other debt in measuring the
market value of the firm (v) and in calculating the net DEBT variable. If the
pension liability of the firm were accurately measured,4 the unfunded vested
liability could be added directly to the market value of conventional debt or,
1Net debt is defined as total financial liabilities minus financial assets.
Short term assets and liabilities are included at book value but long term
liabilities are revalued by assuming that they have a remaining maturity of
ten years and pay a nine percent coupon rate but are valued to have the
1979 year-end yield to maturity of about 12 percent. For many firms in our
sample net debt is actually negative; financial assets including cash and
accounts receivable exceed financial liabilities.
2See Gordon and Nalkiel (1979) and Myers (1977).
31f the unfunded liability is negattve, it actually represents a financial
asset or "negative debt."
4See section one of Feldstein and Seligman (1981) for a discussion of the
problems of pension liability measurement and the inadequacies of the
reported estimates. Note in particular that unfunded liabilities are tax
deductible when funded or paid. Similarly, until liabilities are paid,
the relevant interest rate is a net of tax rate.—9-
equivalently,could be included on the right hand side of the equation (divided
by the replacement value of physical assets) where the expected value of its
coefficient would be minus one. More generally, however, the coefficient of the
observed unfunded vested pension liability variable (UVPL/A) reflects the
errors in the measurement of unfunded pension liabilities and the stock market's
ability to perceive and reflect the existing liabilities.
The specification of the market valuation equation is thus:
(1) + + GROW+ + cçBETA+ DEBT
+ UVPL+
wherec representsarandom error. The values of ct1, c&and are
expectedtobe positive and the values of
c.4and and expected to be
negative.The sign of c* (the coefficient of the debt variable) is uncertain.
Ina strict Modigliani—Miller world, c would be zero. More generally, the
increased risks of bankruptcy and the adverse effect of debt on investment
opportunities would imply that is negative. However, if the taxfactors
discussed by Auerbach (1979) and King (1977) make the value of V/A less than
one for equity while the value of V/A for debt is equal to one, firms with
higher ratios of debt to physical assets will have higher values of V/A and
maybe positive.
As we noted in the introduction, our analysis will examine both the
unfunded vested pension obligations and the broader measure of the total
unfunded accrued liabilities (UAPL/A).
The specification of equation 1 assumes that the valuation ratio
(q)is the same for debt and equity. If, because of tax or risk factors, a
dollar of retained earnings is not worth the same amount as a dollar of capital
financed by debt, it would be more appropriate to analyze the effect of pension-10-
liabilities on the equity value of the firm (yE) .Thisalternative equity
value equation may be written
(2) =ftjiH2GROWE+ ftBETA+DEBT UVPL
where AE is the "equity value" of the physical assets (i.e., the replacement
value of the physical assets minus the value of the net debt and of the pre-
ferred shares), EE is the equity earnings of the firm, and GROWE Is the ten—
year growth of equity earnings. For this purpose, EE is defined as profits
after tax plus the equity owners' real gain or loss on net financial assets
(i.e., the product of the inflation rate and the firm's net financial debt).
Our analysis is based on data for a sample of large manufacturing
firms for 1979. The construction of most of the variables uses the data in the
Standard and Poor's Compustat file. Three factors limit the size of the available
sample. First, since comparable information on earnings for the decade from
1970 through 1979 must be available, firms that were engaged in significant
merger activity had to be eliminated. Second, the interest rate assumed in the
pension liability calculation was only available for 1979 for some firms.
Third, the information required for inflation adjustment (described below) was
not available for all firms. These data requirements and the elimination of a
few statistical outliers reduced the sample to 132 firms.
Economists have long recognized that accounting data for assets and
earnings can be very misleading in a period of inflation like the 1970's.
Beginning with 1976, firms were required to provided information on the replace-
ment value of the firm's capital stock and on the effect of inflation on the
value of accounting depreciation and inventory costs. With this information and—11—
an estimate of the inflation gain on net financial liabilities, it is possible
to estimate an inflation adjusted measure of accounting profits. This was the
procedure found in the earlier Feldstein-Seligman analysis for 1976 and 1977.
Despite the accounting requirement to provide inflation—adjusted
information and the widespread recognition of the distortions created by
inflation, most financial analysts have continued to focus exclusively on the
traditional accounting measures of assets and income. One important indication
of this tendency to disregard the inflation—adjusted data is that by 1979 the
Standard and Poors corporation no longer included the inflation adjusted
accounts in its Compustat File.
Since we are concerned with market valuation and the perception of the
financial community, we have done our analysis with the conventional accounting
data as well as with data adjusted for inflation. Since the inflation—adjusted
data are not available in the Compustat file, we have approximated the inflation
correction for 1979 by using data for 1980 collected from individual annual
reports by Daniel Smith and Lawrence Summers and then deflated to the 1979
level. One of the principal accounting distortions caused by inflation is the
misstatement of inventory costs for firms that use FIFO inventory accounting.
As a further check on our results, we also present estimates only for those
firms that used LIFO as the primary method of inventory evaluation.
We are aware of the difficulty of making valid inferences about the
effect of unfunded pension liabilities on the basis of equations like 1 and 2.
Any omitted variables will bias the estimated coefficient. If, for example,
large unfunded vested liabilities are characteristic of financially weak corn—
panies, the estimates of andwouldreflect this weakness and be biased—12—
away from —1. Moreover, firms can to some extent influence the size of their
reported liabilities by the interest rate assumption that they choose.
A finding that the coefficient of the pension liability variable is
substantially different from —1 must therefore be treated with substantial
caution since the difference may reflect statistical bias rather than a failure
of the financial market to appraise the extent of a firm's pension obligations.
In contrast, a finding that the pension liability, variable has a coefficient of
approximately -1 would be reassuring support for the view that the financial
market correctly assesses pension liabilities since finding the appropriate
answer by chance alone, although possible, would be very unlikely.
2. Effects of Unfunded Pension Liabilities
This section presents the basic estimates of the effects on the value
of the firm of the net pension liabilities as reported by the firms. The
next section discusses the importance of the interest rate assumption used in
valuing pension liabilities and their presents parameter estimates based on
alternative revaluated pension liabilities. The estimates in section 4 examine
several general specifications of the relation between pension liabilities and
the firm's market value.
Equation 1.1 of Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients
corresponding to the specification of equation 1 in the previous section of this
paper. The sample contains all 132 firms and uses inflation adjusted accounting
measures of income and assets. The mean of the dependent variable, the ratio of
the firm's market value to the current value of its physical assets, is 0.87.
Before discussing the coefficient of the pension variable, it is use-
ful to comment on the coefficients of the other variables.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































earnings,E) perdollar of physical assets increases the market value of those
assets. An extra dollar of current earnings adds approximately two dollars
to the market value of the firm. The coefficient of GROW suggests that a higher
rate of past increase of earnings may lead to a higher market value but the
coefficient is smaller than its standard error.1 Companies that spend more
on research and development have significantly greater market value, a rela-
tionship that should be interpreted with care since it presumably reflects the
market's valuation of the general character of companies that spend more on
research rather than a direct effect of research spending on the firm's market
value. All three of these effects are similar to the estimates for 1976 and
1971reportedin Feldstein and Seligman.
A greater riskiness of the firm, as measured by its beta coefficient,
depresses the firm. This is consistent with the theoretical implications of the
capital asset pricing model, although contrary to the insignificant effect round for
1976 and 1971. The weak positive effect of leverage on the firm's total value is
also contrary to the earlier Feldstein—Seligman finding. One possible exp1nation of
this difference is that the sharp increase in inflation (the consumer price index
rose 14.8 percent and 6.8 percent in 1976 and 1977 but 13.3 percent in 1979) might
have raised the equity value of the firms with greater net debt (Summers, 1982).
The coefficient of the unfunded vested liability variable (UvPL/A) is
—1.143 with a standard error of 0.82. The effect is thus clearly signifi-
cantly negative and not significantly different from minus one. By coincidence,
this coefficient is almost identical to the 1977 value of l.1414 (standard error
1The measures Of earnings and earnings growth should be adjusted by adding
the pension expenses and subtracting the increase in accrued pension
liability. This correction is not possible with the data available for
a single year. It is reassuring therefore that the estimated effect of
unfunded vested pension liabilities is not affected by completely omitting
both E and GROW from the equation.—15—
0.47) reported by Feldstein and Seligman (1981). The estimate is consistent with the
view that the financial market accepts the conventional measure of the net unfunded
vested pension liability and reduces the market value of the firm by an equal amount.1
Broadening the definition of unfunded liabilities from vested liabili-
ties to accrued liabilities (equation 1.2) leaves all of the parameter estimates
essentially unchanged. The coefficient of UAPL/A is —1 .42 with a standard error
of 0.65. The suni of squared residuals (SsR =13.18)is slightly smaller than
the corresponding SSR for the vested pension liability, suggesting that the -
financialmarket may give more weight to the broader means of pension liabilities.
One purpose of the inflation adjustment is to correct the understate-
ment of production costs for firms that do not use the last—in—first—out (LIFO)
method of inventory accounting. By 1979, the inflation adjustment had become
extremely important; for all nonfinancial corporations as a whole, the inflation
adjustment was more than 60 percent of real after tax profits. As a further
check, we therefore estimated the basic equation for the subset of 85 firms that
used LIFO as the primary method of inventory accounting. The results, presented
in equations 1.3 and 1.4, are essentially the same as for the entire sample.
Although our emphasis is on the estimates using inflation adjusted
data for earnings and assets, we recognize that the financial community con-
tinues to rely primarily on conventional accounting data. We have therefore
reestimated the basic equations using the conventional accounting figures; the
results are shown in equations 1.5 and 1.6.2 The estimates of the unfunded pen-
1There are somany problems of measurement that we are reluctant to give a stronger.
interpretation. Nevertheless, while coefficients not significantly different from
—1 could occur by chance in the current and previous study, we regard that as
unlikely.
2The mean of the dependent variable is 1.30, substantially higher than the
inflation—adjusted value.—16—
sioriliabilityvariables are essentially unchanged; they are slightly larger
than with the inflation—adjusted data but the difference is less than one stan-
dard error. Earnings, earnings-growth and debt appear to have a larger effect
on the value of the corporation and the level of research and development
spending has a smaller effect. The unfunded accrued liabilities continue to
have slightly greater explanatory power than the unfunded vested liabilities.
Thesecondset of six equations in Table 1 are based on the equity
value of the firm and used the specification of equation 2 in section 1.1The
coefficients of the four equations estimated with inflation—adjusted data
(equations 1.7 through 1.10) are essentially identical to the corresponding
coefficients based on the market valueof debt and equity (equation 1.1
through 1.4). This similarity of results with the two specifications was
also found for 1976 and 1977 in the earlier study by Feldstein and Seligman.
When the conventional accounting data are used without adjustment for inflation
(equation 1.11 and 1.12), the coefficients of the unfunded pension liability
variables are reduced substantially to approximately -0.7 and are about equal in
size to their standard errors. On the basis of these two coefficients alone,
one could not reject the hypothesis that the true parameter is either zero or
minus one. Although we regard the instability of the coefficients estimated
with conventional accounting data as evidence against relying on such data
without inflation adjustment, we recognize that these estimates can also be
1The dependent variable is VE/AE where VE is the market value of the firm's
stock and AEis thedifference between the value of property, plant, equipment
and inventories and the firm's net debt. The mean of this variable is 0.82
when the data are inflation adjusted and 1.54 when they are not inflation
adjusted.-17-
interpreted as raising some doubt about the conclusion that the coefficientof
the pension variable is significantly negative. We shalltherefore continue to
present estimates in the later sections of' thepaper based on the conventional
accounting data as well as on the data which has been adjusted for inflation.
3. Alternative Interest Rate Assumptions
It has been customary for pension actuaries to assumealow rate of
interest in calculating the present value of pension liabilities.Thus the
average interest rate assumed by the 132 firms in our sample was only 7.3
percent,far less than the 12.1 percent rate on Baa bonds thatprevailed at the
end of 1979 or the 10.7 percent average Baa rate for theyear 1979 as a whole.1
Using a low discount rate increases the present value of vestedpension benefits
and therefore of the unfunded pension liability.
In considering the effect of the interest rateassumption, it is
important to distinguish between vested pension liabilities and the total future
pension benefits thata firm expects to pay to its current employees andon the
basis of which it may legally determine its funding contributions.In esti-
mating the total future pension benefits, the firm must project theemployees'
future wage growth (as well as the probabilities of death andof employment
separation.) The typical pension benefit formula relatesan individual's
retirement benefits to his wage during ayear or a few year's immediately before
Despite the tax advantage of investing pension funds exclusively in debt
instruments ('Black, 1980, Tepper, 1980), most pensions invest in bothdebt
and equity and, considering the greater risk ofequity as a method of funding
nominal liabilities, expect to earn an even higher nominal returnon equity.
It might, however, be argued that the appropriate rate fordiscounting future
liabilities is a risk—free rate, with any extra return going to shareholders
as compensation for assuming the portfolio risk while guaranteeing the bene-
fits. But even a 10 year U.S. Treasury bond hada 1979 year—end yield of
10.4 percent.-18-
retirement. The present value at any time in an employee's career of the bene-
fits that he will be paid during his first year of retirement depends on the
difference between the discount rate and the projected rate of growth of wages.
Since pension actuaries have generally assumed a low rate of wage growth, the
use of a low discount rate may not produce as substantial a bias in their esti-
mates of total future pension liabilities as it might at first appear. The
value of benefits to be paid after retirement, however, depends only on the
discount rate, implying that the present value of total future pension benefits
is typically overstated.
Vested pension benefits depend only on an employee's previous
0
experiencewith the firm. Although that experience will entitle the employee to
greater future benefits if he stays with the firm,1 the future annual value of
his benefit is fixed if he leaves the firm immediately. Thus, in calculating
the present value of vested benefits, the likely future growth of wages is
irrelevant. The assumptions of an artificially low interest rate unambiguoi.sly
raises the value of vested pension liabilities.2 The same upward bias occurs in
the calculations of the present value of unvested benefits based on past service
and therefore on the total accrued pension liability.
typical defined benefit pension plan makes retirement benefits proportional
to the product of the final years (or years') earnings and the number of years
of employment with the firm.
2The low interest rate assumption is advantageous to the firm because it
permits the firm to make greater tax—deductible pension contributions.
We return to this in section 5.—19—
The 132 companies in our sample assumed interest rates that ranged
from 5percentto 10.5 percent. For all but 13 companies, the rate was between
6percentand 9 percent. The assumed interest rates thus differ significantJ,y
from each other andfromthe actual rate of return available on pension fund
assets. Since the firms reported pension assets and vested liabilities that are
approximately equal in value,1 a chan,e in the interest rate could have
asignificant effect on theestimate of unfunded liabilities and therefore
potentiallyon the estimated regression coefficient of this variable in the
market value equation.
The effect on the present value of vested pension benefits of changes
in the interest rate assumption depends on the current distribution of vested
benefits among employees and retirees of different ages. ¶Lb1e 2 shows the
actuarial present value of a dollar a year from age 65 untildeath evaluated at
agesbetween L5 and 70 for three different interest rates.2 The closer an
employee is to retirement, the nearer in time are his benefits and the less sen-
sitive is their present value to the interest rate assumption. For example,
1The mean absolute value of unfunded vested pension liabilities as apercen—
tae of pension assets was only6.56 percent;for total accrued pension
liabilities, the corresponding figure was 1.02 percent.
2The actuarial present value was calculated usin the 1978age specific death
rates for white males that are presented in the l930 Statistical Abstract
of the United States.-20-
Table 2
Actuarial Present Value of One Dollar




70 6.5 5.9 4.3
65 9.0 7.9 6.5
60 6.0 4.9 3.6
55 4.3 3.2 2.2
45 2.2 1.3 0.8
increasing the discount rate from 6 percent to 8 percent reduces the value of
the pension benefit by 14 percent at age65but 21 percent at age 60.
Unfortunately, data are not available for each firmonthe distribu-
tion of vested pension benefits by employee and retiree age. Although the
actual distribution will differ among firms, it is clear that most ofthe
"weight" of the typical vested pension distribution is among retirees and older
employees in the years just before retirement. This concentration reflects
three things. First and most important, the benefits of retirees and older
workers are closer in time and therefore subject to less mortality risk and less
interest rate discounting. Table 2 shows that the present actuarial value of a
given benefit is reduced to half or less between ages 65 and 55. Noreover, the
actuarial present value of a one dollar annual benefit at age 70 is worth more—21—
than the prospect at age 60 of a one dollar benefit from age 65. Second, older
workers and retirees have generally accumulated more years of service with a
firm and vested benefits are generally proportional to the number of years of
service after an initial period. Finally, older workers generally have higher
earnings and vested benefits are also proportional to earnings.1
Bulow (1979) reports that professional actuaries often assume as a
rule of thumb that the age distribution of vested benefits is such that the
overall present value of vested benefits is inversely proportional to the rate
of interest. It is clear from Table 2 that the actual relation differs by age
and that the inverse proportionality rule holds at about age 55 for a comparison
of 6 and 8 percent interest rates and at about age 65 for a comparison of 8 and
10 percent interest rates. Our analysis in this paper uses the inverse propor-
tionality assumption because data for developing a better weighting are not
available. While we believe that the resulting estimates of vested pension
liabilities are an improvement over using the reported values with varying
interest rate assumptions, we caution that the adjustment procedure is only an
approximation. It would clearly be desirable to obtain information on the age
distribution of vested benefits for all companies in the sample or even for a
smaller sample of companies that might be used to develop weights to apply to
figures like those of Table 2.
We have made two different types of interest rate adjustments in
recalculating pension benefits. First, we standardize all pension liabilities
to the Baa bond rate of 12.1 percent prevailing at the end of 1979. Since no
1Thismay be offset to the extent that retirees had lower nominal earnings
before retirement than employees currently have.—22—
firm used an interest rate even remotely as high as this, it seems unlikely that
the financial market implicitly used such a high rate in evaluating the
unfunded pension liabilities. This is confirmed by the estimates presented
below that show using such a high discount rate reduces the explanatory power of
the market valuation equation and causes the coefficient of the pension
liability variables to be small and insignificant.
The second adjustment standardizes all pension liabilities to a
discount rate of 7.2 percent, the average rate used by the 132 firms in the
sample. This has the effect of eliminating the relative overstatements and
understatements of pension liabilities that result from the variety of interest
rate assumptions while changing very little the estimated liability for firms
that use a rate close to the average for the group. It is equivalent to
assuming that financial markets adjust the stated pension liabilities for
deviations from common practice rather than for deviations from a Baa rate.
Table 3 summarizes the effect of different interest rate assumptions
on the estimated impact of pension liabilities on the market value of the firm.
The estimates are based on the specifications presented in Table 1 and therefore
in equations 1 and 2 of section 1.For each equation, Table 3 presents only the
estimated pension liability coefficient and the sum of squared residuals for the
corresponding equation.
Consider first the effect of the unfunded vested liability on the
total market value of the firm. Using inflation adjusted data and the reported
value of the unfunded vested liability implies a regression coefficient of —1 .43
with a standard error of 0.82. This figure was presented in equation 1.1 of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thepresent value of vested benefits discounted at the Baa rate is
approximated by multiplying each firm's reported liability by the ratio of its
actual interest rate to the 1919 year—end Baa rate of 12.1 percent. With this
adjustment, almost all firms had negative unfunded vested liabilities. Pension
assets exceed the recalculated vested liabilities by amounts that averaged 8.7
percent of the replacement value of the firm's physical assets. With these
adjusted unfunded vested liabilities, the estimated regression coefficient is
only —0.31 with a standard deviation of 0.143. The corresponding sum of squared
residuals (13.65) is however greater than the sum of squared residuals with the
actual interest rate (13.35), implying that the Baa rate is a less likely
specification of the market valuations model.
By contrast, adjusting the vested pension liabilities to the common
average interest rate of 1.2 percent provides a substantially better explanation
of the data (the sum of squared residuals is only 12.89) and implies a
regression coefficient of —0.90 with a standard error of 0.33. This evidence
is consistent with the view that the financial markets disregard the differences
in unfunded pension liabilities and evaluate pension liabilities in terms of a
common average discount rate. Although we have not done a search over different
possible interest rates, to find a maximum likelihood estimate of this parameter
it is clear that the assumed average rate of 1.2 is substantially more likely
than either the Baa rate or the variety of rates actually used by the individual
companies. The regression coefficient of —0.90 with a standard error of 0.33
strongly supports the view that unfunded vested pension obligations, when
correctly valued, depress the value of the firm by approximately one dollar for
every dollar of unfunded obliè,ation or, equivalently, raise the market value of—25—
the firm by one dollar for every dollar of pension assets in excess of the
vested pension liability.
The results for the total accrued liabilities are very similar. The
constant average interest rate has the best explanatory power (with a sum of
squared residuals of 12.73) and a coefficient of —0.89. Comparing the sums of
squared residuals for total accrued liabilities and vested liabilities suggests
that the accrued liability provides a slightly better explanation of the market
value of the firm. But the choice between vested and accrued liabilities does
not influence the conclusion that the common average interest rate is best and
that the effect of net pension liabilities on the market value of the firm js
approximately dollar for dollar.
Changing the specification from the total market value of the firm to
the market value of equity also has virtually no effect on the estimated coef-
ficients of the unfunded pension liability variables. The specification with
the lowest sum of squared residuals again corresponds to the unfunded accrued
liability evaluated with the common average rate of return.
When the conventional accounting data are used without inflation
adjustment, the estimated coefficients are less stable. For the total market
value of the firm, the evidence indicates that the best specification uses the
actual interest rate and unfunded accrued liabilities. The coefficient of the
pension liability variable is -1.59 with a standard error of 0.48. The Baa rate
has a substantially higher residual sum of squares. With the common average
interestrate, the coefficient is—0.05 with a standard error of 0.23.
Finally,for the market value of the corporate equity, the best speci-
ficationcorresponds to the common average interest rate. The coefficient of—26—
the unfunded vested pension liability is —0.85 with a standard error of 0.20 and
therefore quite similar to the estimate with the inflation adjusted variables.
Because the unfunded pension liabilities evaluated at a common average
interest rate generally have a better explanatory power than the corresponding
reported pension liabilities, we have reestimated the specifications of table 1
with these more appropriately measured pension variables. The results are pre-
sented in Table 4. The coefficients of the pension variables estimated for our
entire sample of firms have already been discussed in conjunction with
Table 3. For the sample of firms that use LIFO inventory accounting, the
unfunded pension liabilities are between —1.54 and —2.03. The coefficients of
the other variables are quite similar to their values in Table 1.
Although we have included five variables that can influence the market
value of the firm, it is of course still possible that the unfunded pension
liability is correlated with some other omitted variable and that the apparent
effort of the unfunded pension liability is really only a reflection of this
omitted variable. In particular, it might be argued that "strong" companies
fully fund or overfund their accumulated liabilities while "weaker" companies
have large unfunded liabilities. To the extent that this is true and that cor-
porate strength and weakness are not reflected in the other variables, the nega-
tive coefficient of the unfunded liability will reflect the corporation's
generally weak financial position. Although it is clearly impossible to rule
out completely such an "omitted variable" argument, we have tried to test for
the importance of such an effect by reestimating the inflation adjusted
equations of Table 4 with the company's bond rating as an additional variable.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































strength of the company. To incorporate this variable, we use the Moody's bond
rating for the longest maturity bond issued in 1979 and scale this rating
from a 9 for an Aaa rated bond to 4 for a B rated bond.
For the equations determining the total market value of debt and
equity, the coefficient of this variable as small (0.04) and barely larger than
its standard error. Including it in the equation actually raised the absolute
value of the coefficient of the pension liability variable. For the equation
determining the market value of corporate equity, the coefficient of the bond
rating variable is slightly larger (about 0.09) and about twice its standard
error. Including this variable reduces the coefficient of the unfunded pension
liability variable by approximately 0.05.Thusincluding a general measure of
the financial strength of the company does not alter the estimated effect of
unfunded pensions.1
4. Additional Specification
The estimates presented in the previous sections assume that there is
a linear relation between the market value of the firm and its unfunded vested
pension liabilities. This specification implies that a one dollar increase in
the firm's pension liability has the same effect on the firm's value as a one
dollar decrease in the value of the firm's pension assets. The linear specifi-
cation also implies that the market responds in the same way to unfunded liabi-
lities that are positive as it does to unfunded liabilities that are negative.
The present section presents estimates that relax these constraints.
1Jererny Bulow has told us that he has investigated the relation between unfunded
pension liabilities and the rate of return on equity over the previous decade














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Separating Assets and Liabilities
The equations in Table 5 include the value of pension assets per
dollar of the firms physical assets (PA/A or PA/AE) as well as the unfunded pen-
sion liability variables. All of the equations are based on inflation adjusted
data and separate estimates are presented using the reported pension liabilities
and liabilities adjusted to a common average discount rate.
The coefficients in equation 5.1 are representative of all of the equations
for total market value of debt and equity in this table. The estimated parameter
values for the non-pension variables are very similar to the corresponding figures in
equation 1.1 of Table 1 which had the same specification without the separate pension
assets variable.. The coeffIcient of unfunded vested pension liabilities is now
slightly lower (—1.14 with a standard error of 0.82) while the coefficLent of the
pension assets variable is —0.55 with a standard error, of 0.28.
Including the pension asset variable is equivalent to estimating
separate coefficients for vested pension liabilities and pension assets. The
coefficient of UVPL/A measures the effect of increases in vested pension liabi-
lities (—1.14 dollars of market value per dollar of vested pension liability)
while the difference between the coefficients of PA/A and of UVPL/A measures the
effect of increases in pension assets (i.e., —0.55 +1.14=0.59dollars of
market value per dollar of pension assets.) This coefficient of pension assets
has a larger standard error (0.91), implying that when pension assets and pen-
sion liabilities are included as separate variables neither can be estimated
with any precision.1
Using the liability variables adjusted to a common average interest
rate (equation 5.3 and 5.4) permits much more precise parameter etimates. The
11t is however possible tosay that the difference between the coefficients
of the liability and asset variables is statistically significant.—31—
implied coefficient of vested pension liabilities is —0.91 with a sttnd.ard error
of0.32whilethe implied coefficient of pension assets is 0.29 witha standard
error of 0.142. This implies that liabilities have a substantial nebative effect
on the market value of the finn that is not significantly different from minus
one while assets have a much smaller effect that may not differ from zero. One
possible reason for this asymmetry is that the financial market ma,y regard 1are
pension assets as an indication that the firm projects large pension liabilities
that will have to be paid on the basis of future employment service.1'2
The estimates based on the market value of corporate equity imply that
pension assets have a greater effect that is not significantly different from
the effect of pension liabilities. In equation 5.5, for example, the implied
effect of pension assets is 0.914 dollars of market value per dollar of pension
assets. With the more precisely estimated coefficients corresponding to a corn-.
mon average discount rate, the implied coefficient of pension liabilities is
—0.91 (with a standard error of 0.29) while the implIed coefficient of pension
assets is 0.55 with a standard error of 0.36. The difference between these two
coefficients is inarina1ly significant; the corresponding t—statistic is 1.8 and
therefore significant at the 7 percent level.
Taken at face value, the coefficients in Table 5 generally imply that
each dollar increase in a firm's pension liabilities reduces the firm's market
value by about one dollar while each dollar increase in pension assets increases
in value by less that a dollar. If this is correct, it provides at least a
1Recall that a uiniican accumulate pension assets only to the extent that it
can satisfy the Internal Revenue Service that these assets are a reasonable
provision against future pension liabilities. Note also that this explanation
assumes that the value of such liabilities will not be offset by lower wages
in the future.
2Stuart Myers has pointed out tous that, when separate coefficients are estimated
for pension assets and liabilities, it is not possible to distinguish among dif-
ferent assumed constant discount rates. The superiority of a common rate over
varying individual assumptions remains.—32—
short-run reason for firms not to fully fund or overfund their pensions. It
also implies that to the extent that firms make pension promises that reduce the
savings of employees, the market perceives the extra liability and therefore
has the information to adjust other personal saving. At the same time, the
lower coefficient of the pension assets variable implies that the market does
not accurately reflect the extent of asset accumulation in the pension fund.
The net effect of this is that an increase in a funded vested liability reduces
the market value of the firm and induces additional saving.
Positive and Negative Net Liabilities
A different but related issue is raised by the fact that pension
assets exceed liabilities for the majority of the firms in our sample. Does the
market respond differently to "unfunded" pension liabilities that are positive
and to the unfunded liabilities that are negative and therefore represent an
additional net asset of the firm? To answer this question, we have divided each
unfunded pension liability variable into two variables, e.g., PUVPL/A is UVPL/A
if this is a positive amount (implying that liabilities exceed assets) and
NUVPL/A if IJVPL/A is a negative amount (implying that assets exceed liabilities.)
Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients of the positive and, nega-
tive pension liability variables. These coefficients are based on the same
basic specification used in Tables 1 and 4. The pension liabilities are
adjusted to a common average discount rate and all of the data are adjusted for
inflat ion.
Allfour parameter estimates show a much larger negative coefficient
forthe firms with actual unfunded liabilities (the "positive" liability


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































each case, the pension coefficient for the firms in which assets exceed liabili-
ties is approximately —0.S with a standard error of about 0.4. These coef-
ficients are therefore not significantly different from either zero or minus one.
In contrast, the pension coefficient for the firms in which liabilities exceed
assets is approximately minus two with a standard error of about 0.8. These
coefficients are all significantly different from zero and again not signifi-
cantly different from minus one.
An explicit test of the equality of the two pension coefficients in
each equation indicates that equality cannot be rejected at the 10 percent pro-
bability level in the equations relating to the total market va:lue of the firm
but can be rejected at the 5 and 8 percent probability levels in the equation
for the market value of corporate equity.
1-low should these egtimates be interpreted? One possible interpreta-
tion is that, because of the large standard errors, there is no need to
distinguish between the two types of firms or to revise the conclusion that an
extra dollar of unfunded vested pension liability reduces the market value of
the firm by approximately one dollar. An alternative "statistical" explanation
is that the equation is misapecified and omits additional variables that are
observed by participants in the financial markets and that are correlated with
the size of pension liabilities. Thus, although the financial market may
correctly reduce or increase a company's market value by a dollar for each
dollar of positive or negative unfunded vested pension liability, our estimated
coefficient instead reflects the impact of the additional omitted variables.
It is, however, also possible that the observed difference between the
"positive" and "negative" coefficients are more than statistical artifact and do
reflect the way that the financial market responds differently to these two—35—
types of firms. Since a firm that fails to fund fully its vested or past ser-
vice liability incurs a higher corporate tax than would otherwise be necessary,
a firm's failure to fund these liabilities may be an indication to the financial
market that the firm is in a financially weak position or is not well managed.
This could account for coefficients of the unfunded liability variables that are
absolutely greater than one. This argument would, however, suggest a sym-
metrically favorable effect on a firm's market value if its pension liabilities
are substantially overfunded and therefore an equally large negative coefficient
for firms with negative unfunded liabilities. One reason why this is not
observed is that, as we noted earlier in this section, the financial market may
regard large pension assets as an indication that the firm has correspondingly
large future pension benefits that are not yet vested or based on past service
but that can he reasonably anticipated for the future. We can think of no way
to test this two part explanation.
5. Why Firms Choose Different Interest Assumptions
As we noted in section 3, the choice of the discount rate has a very
powerful effect on the value of vested and other accrued pension liabilities.
Since these benefits are based only on employees' past service, future wage
rates and turnover rates are irrelevant. As a rough approximation, the value of
unfunded pension liabilities varies in inverse proportion to the assumed
interest rate.
The tax law provides a strong reason for companies to assume a low
interest rate. By increasing the value of its pension liability, the firm can
justify accumulating more pension assets. For any given stream of anticipated
benefits, the accumulation of more pension assets is equivalent to reducing the—36—
real cost of those pensions. The reduced cost reflects the fact that the
earnings in the pension fund are untaxed while earnings on assets held by the
corporation are taxed and the interest rate that the corporation pays on its own
debt is deductible from taxable income.
If the tax benefits of early funding were the only influence on the
choice of an interest rate assumption, firms would choose the lowest permissible
interest rate. But a low interest rate assumption also has it disadvantages.
Firms may wish to avoid making the large annual funding payments that would
result from a low interest assumption and may not wish to report that they have
large unfunded pensions liabilities. To the extent that this is true, they will
prefera higher interest assumption.
A large unfunded liability requires a firm to increase the annual
contributionto its pension fund. This directly reduces the firms reported ear-
nings. Firms may fear that this in turn will have an adverse effect on the
market price of the firms' stock because portfolio investors do not correctly
perceive the reason for the lower reported earnings. Moreover, a firm that has
limited access to credit or that faces a rising marginal cost of funds may
prefer to postpone funding. To the extent that a firm can fund as much as it
wants at a moderate or high interest rate, it will have no incentive to use a
lower interest rate.
A large unfunded liability may also he regarded by corporate manage—
ment as undesirable in itself.It wold not be unreasonable for them to fear
that such a liability would depress the equity value of the firm and increase
its cost of debt.If financial investors are unable to take the firm's choice
of interest rate into account in interpreting its reputed liability, the firm
may be able to raise its value by selecting a high interest rate that causes-37-
Firmsthat have large vested pension liabilites when calculated at
somestandard rate will have more incentive to reduce their apparent liability
by selecting a high interest rate. Even more likely, firms that have large
unfunded liabilities (when valued at a standard interest rate) will have an
incentive to choose a high interest rate andvirtuallynothing to gain by
choosing a low rate. Conversely, firms in which pension assets exceed liability
(when valued at a standard rate) will have no reason to disguise the size of
their promised liability and every reason to increase the size of that'liability
in order to increase the rate of tax—deductible funding.
The evidence that we have examined indicates that firms do systemati-
cally choose their interest rate assumption in the way that this analysis
suggests. Table 7 presents estimates of the way in which the choice of interest
rate is influenced by the firm's pension liability (adjusted to the common
average discount rate to permit comparability) and by other variables that
measure the firm's financial condition.
Equation 7.1 shows that firms with large vested pension liabilities
tend to choose high interest rate assumptions. The assumed interest rate is
related even more strongly to the firm's unfunded vested pension liability, a
fact shown in equation 7.2. Firms with higher ratios of net debt to assets may
be more reluctant to increase the size of their pension fund and therefore may
prefer a higher assumed interest rate. The coefficient of DEBT/A in equation 3
is positive but just barely larger than its standard error.
Equations 7.4 and 7.5 indicate that the choice of the interest rate
assumption can also be explained by reference to the total accrued pension

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Equations 7.6 and 7.7 indicate that firms with better bond ratings
choose higher interest rates.1 Again the coefficient of this variable is only
slightly larger than its standard error and may be due to chance. If it is not
due to chance, the positive relation between bond rating and the choice of
interest assumptions suggests that the causation is actually from the interest
rate assumption to the bond rating. Thus, a firm with a given "true" value of
UVPL/A that chooses a high interest rate assumption will appear to have a
smaller pension liability. This in turn makes the firm appear financially sound
if the rating agency does not take its interest rate assumption into account.
The last three equations are based on data that have not been adjusted
for inflation. Those results are quite similar to the corresponding equations
with inflation adjusted data.
It is clear from the estimates presented in Table 7 that firms do
engage in strategic attempts to reduce their reported unfunded vested pension
liabilities when the benefits from doing so may outweigh the tax advantages of
early funding.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of the current study has been to assess the extent to
which. the market value of firmsreflectsaccurately their unfunded pension obli-
gations. Although there are substantial problems in measuring pension liabili-
ties and in specifying an appropriate framework for estimating their effect on
1Recall that the bond rating variable scores Moody's Aaa bondsas 9 and
decreases the score linearly with lower bond ratings.—40—
market values, the results presented in this paper can be said to be generally
consistent with the view that the market value of firms reflects a conventional
measure of unfunded pension obligations or net pension assets.
The value of vested pension liabilities depends critically on the
interest rate that firms use to discount future benefit oblications. The 132
large manufacturing firms in the sample used a wide range of interest rates from
5.0 percent to 10.5 percent in evaluating their 1979 pension liabilities. The
choice of interest rate appears to reflect the deliberate policy of firms with
substantial benefit obligations relative to existing pension assets to try to
reduce the reputed present value of their obligation. Similarly, firms in which
pension assets are large relative to benefit obligations tend to choose low
interest rate assumptions in order to increase the tax advantages of early
funding.
The financial market appears to "see through" this manipulation of
pension liabilities and sets market values that are related more closely to a
pension obligation evaluated at a common standard interest rate than to the pen-
sion obligations as reported by the finns. Although an appropriate interest
rate for evaluating pension obligations would be the long—term interest rate
prevailing in 1979, our evidence indicates that market values of firms are
related much more closely to pension liabilities evaluated at the average rate
used by all of the firms in our sample (7.2 percent) than to the pension liabi—
lities implied by the Baa rate (1 2.1 percent).
The majority of firms in the sample have pension assets that exceed
the value of pension liabilities. There is some evidence in our estimates that
the market gives more weight to pension liabilities than to pension assets and—41—
responds more to variations in the excess of liabilities over assets than to the
excess of assets over liabilities. Although we offer son tentative explana-
tions of these asymmetries, we are aware that they might also be an indication
of a misspecification of the basic equations.
Moreresearch with additional data could help to resolve, some of the
remaining problems. Using cross—section data on apanel of firms for several
yearswouldpermiteliminating firm specific effects that may bias the estimated
effectof the pension liabilities. With data for several years, it might also
be possible to modify the measurement of earnings to include information on
pension contributions and the changes in vested pension liabilities. It would
certainty be very useful to obtain data on the age distribution of vested bene-
fit obligations in order to improve the adjustment of total vested obligations
to a common rate of interest.
If the two basic findings of this study ——thatthe market appears to
seethroughthe"pension veil" and that the market value of the firmreflects
pension obligations evaluated at an interest rate that is far below the market
rate ——arecorrect, they have important implications for the relation of pen-
sions to national saving. First, pension liabilities are evaluated at an
interest rate that is too low, the present value of those liabilities is
overstated. Thus share prices are depressed by larger pension obligations and
shareholders have an increased incentive to save. Second, if pension assets are
correctly perceived by the financial market, the extent of pension funding will
not influence aggregate priva,te saving. Moreover, to the extent that the evi-
dence of section I implies that the market gives too little value to pension
assets, an increase in pension assets will not reduce other private savingby an—42—
offsetting amount. The overstatement of pension liabilities and the possible
understatement of pension assets thus suggests that the expanding size of the
private pension system may increase total saving by companies and their share
holders.1
1Any conclusion about the overall effect of pensions on saving depends also
on the response of employees to promised pension benefits. It is of course
possible that employees may substitute promised pension benefits for direct
saving. If the interest rate that they would anticipate on their own direct
saving is less than the interest rate earned by the pension fund, total
saving could decline. Alternatively, the higher potential yield on pension
saving might induce employees to increase planned retirement consumption by
enough to raise the level of current saving despite the higher interest rate.
The problem is closely related to the discussion in Feldstein (1978b).—43—
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